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# The Slow Murder The American Intelligence

by Benjamin F. Schemmer and the Journal Editors

STANSFIELD TURNER IS ADMINISTERING THE *COUP DE GRACE* to the slow murder of the National Intelligence Community. The initial hope of many intelligence analysts in 1977 that he would replace investigations with reform, and political interference with objectivity and high quality analysis, faded in 1978 into discouragement—and often into contempt.

Turner's willingness to politicize intelligence, his priority for self-advancement, preference for technology over people, and his single-minded focus on centralizing control of the intelligence budget and collection activities has destroyed morale within the Central Intelligence Agency, led hundreds of key CIA personnel to resign, and has prompted far more to "retire in place." While Turner has done some useful work to continue cutting back CIA's once bloated operations staff and to reform the Intelligence Community administratively, that progress has been more than offset by damage he has done to its Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection capabilities, to CIA's integrity and independence, and—most important—to the quality of its product.

Administration sources admit that more than 250 CIA professionals put in their papers during the first pay period of January, and rumors have gone as high as 600. Further, these resignations include such personnel as Sayre Stevens, Deputy Director of the National Foreign Assessments Center (NFAC); Dick Cristenson, Chief Office of Regional & Political Analysis; Vince Heyman, Chief of CIA's Operations Center; John Blake, the Deputy Director for Administration; and Ernie Olne, the Agency's chief Iranian analyst. And at press time, *AFJ* learned Anthony Lapham, CIA's General Counsel, had also resigned and will be leaving in April for "personal reasons."

Some of CIA's massive resignations are the legitimate result of deadlines imposed by retirement incentives (because senior officials reached the "high three" level, having served three years in the highest pay grade counted for retirement), and because new government-wide conflict of interest regulations (resulting from the Ethics Law of 1978) soon would have made it impossible for many to find an outside job. But far too many resignations symbolize the fact that the I

Carter Administration will ever provide effective leadership and reform. Several of the departing officials told Turner candidly that they were leaving because of his pervasive interference in intelligence reporting—in areas where he had neither intellectual depth or expertise, and in which he overrode expert opinion with his own judgement.

This broad dissatisfaction with Turner occurs among personnel the nation needs most to keep, the intellectual cadre that is the brain of the American Intelligence Community. The professionals Turner has disenchanted are not "cold warriors," special or "black" operations executives, or counter-intelligence officers. The firing of Operations Director William Wells, and the firing, retirement, or reshuffling of 820 operations personnel in Turner's 1977 "Halloween Purge" had already removed most of that cadre from the Community, a reform that former CIA Director William Colby had proposed earlier in a form that even more drastic cuts than Turner's.

The men who are now rejecting Turner and the present senior management structure that the Carter Administration has brought to Intelligence, are men who quietly fought pressure from a parade of CIA Directors to give the Rostows, Kissingers, and Brzezinskis intelligence analysis which was tailored to their policies of the moment on Vietnam, Cambodia, SALT II, Angola, and Iran.

These analysts and managers are also men who stayed on when the Community's best positions were given to "operators" who had little understanding of modern collection and analytic methods. In fact, for all the sound and fury of Turner's actions, this conflict between the operations and analysis aspects of CIA's work is still one of the agency's most pressing problems. Despite Turner's purge, the operations managers still believe they are best qualified to interpret events—especially politico-military events, and they still control the access to sensitive source reporting which allows them to play one-upmanship with the analysts they are supposed to support.

## The Professionals

### Can Stick It Out No Longer

There are limits to any man's dedication. CIA's intelligence professionals are men who stuck it out through investigation after investigation and director after director,

with inflation, but more work because Turner ignored analytic personnel needs to buy more technical collection assets—in spite of the fact the Community lacks the analytic manpower to process its existing "take." They have worked for two years under a director who systematically hamstrung or ignored HUMINT, and whose priority are reflected in the fact that the entire US intelligence community now has only 20 to 40 analysts covering *all* of Africa, and roughly half that number for *all* of South America.

Under the Carter Administration, The National Intelligence Community's Senior Management Answer to, "Why Not the Best?" Is "Here Are The Worst."

Ironically, such CIA professionals originally shared the hope Stansfield Turner and the Carter Administration would end management structures that had become a political filter between intelligence and the user. They were joined in these hopes by many professionals in the National Security Council (NSC) staff, State Department, National Security Agency (NSA), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Stansfield Turner became DCI with unique and wide-ranging, bi-partisan support from the Senate and House Committees on intelligence. There was a general belief that the reforms begun under President Ford would receive far more